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November  1988 Introduction 
This paper examines the impact of federal grant policies on 
capital scrappage decisions by local governments.  Large subsidies for new 
capital potentially shorten equipment life by inducing substitution of new 
capital for the maintenance of existing capital,  leading to shorter 
equipment life than would occur under cost-minimization.  This distortion 
provides one possible explanation for the "infrastructure crisis" that has 
drawn recent attention in political and media circles.  1 
In a companion paper,  I demonstrate that vehicle maintenance 
spending is significantly higher among private owners of transit capital 
than among public owners of similar equipment, suggesting that federal 
subsidies distort local public capital decisions.  2 
The present paper uses newly developed hazard model estimators to 
examine scrappage decisions in the public and private sectors.  The results 
demonstrate that federal policy has important effects on local public 
scrappage decisions. 
The operations research literature includes extensive analysis of 
scrappage and maintenance decisions and of the implied conditions for 
optimal equipment life and maintenance policies.  A model from this 
tradition is used to examine the impact of federal capital subsidies on 
local decisions and to show that a subsidy for new capital purchases  (but not for maintenance of existing capital) will induce local governments to 
scrap equipment before the optimal scrappage point.  The bias in federal 
policy towards subsidizing capital purchases versus operating expenses thus 
offers a potential explanation for the perceived excessive deterioration in 
the local public capital stock. 
To examine the importance of federal grant policies for local 
scrappage decisions,  I use hazard modeling techniques with a new data set 
on operations and vehicle fleets of local mass-transit providers.  The 
data,  collected by the Urban Mass Transportation  Administration  (UMTA), 
provide an  unusually precise measure of the physical capital stock of 436 
public and private transit properties nationwide.  The empirical analysis 
uses estimators common to studies of unemployment duration, including the 
Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard estimator, a fully-parametric proportional 
hazard estimator,  and Meyer's  (1988)  semiparametric hazard estimator 
(SPHE).  The results demonstrate the advantages of SPHE and provide strong 
evidence that federal grant policies have a direct impact on local 
scrappage decisions. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 uses a model of 
optimal equipment life to predict the impact of federal grants on scrappage 
decisions.  Section 2 discusses the data set and federal grant policies for 
mass-transit capital.  Sections 3 and 4  present the Kaplan-Meier and the 
fully-parametric proportional hazard model estimates,  respectively. 
Section 5 presents results using SPHE and discusses the differences between SPHE and the previous estimators.  Finally, section 6 presents conclusions 
and discusses the implications of the results for federal grant policies. I. A Model of Optimal E~uivment  Life 
This section models scrappage to demonstrate the impact of 
4  federal subsidies on optimal equipment life.  Consider a cost-minimizing 
firm or local government that decides when to scrap a machine it already 
owns.  We assume that the machine is not replaced when scrapped and that 
maintenance M(t)  increases while operating receipts Q(t)  decrease over 
time.  The firm chooses the scrappage time T that maximizes the present 
value of net receipts,  A(T),  flowing from the machine 
where w"'  is the price of maintenance and q is the purchase price of the 
machine.  Setting A'(T)  =  0  yields first-order condition 
which holds that equipment is scrapped when the return on it is offset by 
necessary maintenance expenditures.  Notice that in this simple problem, 
with no replacement, the price of new capital does not affect scrappage 
decisions. 
If a machine is replaced by an identical machine when scrapped, 
and if this process continues indefinitely, the firm's problem then is to choose T to maximize B(T),  the discounted value of net receipts from this 
sequence. 
Setting B'(T)  =  0 yields first-order condition  (4)  that 
shows that scrappage occurs when the current accrual of costs 
Q(T)  -  wmbf(T),  equals the long-run average costs of the infinite 
sequence, rB(T) . 
Noting that the purchase price enters this condition through 
the definitions of B(T)  and A(T),  we can use standard comparative statics 
to show the effects of subsidies on  scrappage decisions.  Substituting 
these definitions into  (4)  and noting that B(T)  =  A(T)/(l  -  e-rT) 
yields 
which forms an implicit function Q(T,  q,  @)  = 0.  We then have a,  = r > 0,  and 
-I,  dT  -'w  yielding  dT = -  >  0  and -  = -  < 0  . 
dq  QT  dWm  QT 
It follows that a federal subsidy for new capital purchases at a 
matching rate GCf  lowers the effective equipment price to 
(1  -  GCf)q and reduces the optimal equipment life T* chosen by a 
local government.  A federal subsidy for operating expenses at matching 
rate Gof,  however,  reduces the effective maintenance price to 
(~-G'~)W~  and would raise T*.  If both subsidies are in place, the 
net effect on T* is ambiguous. 
Similar arguments hold for a private firm that receives tax 
benefits from new investment through investment tax credits c and the 
present value of depreciation deductions rz,  yielding an effective 
equipment price of  (1  -  c -  rz)q, but deducts maintenance expenses from 
profits,  yielding an effective maintenance price of  (1  -  r)P . 
Consider a federal subsidy that can only be used to replace equipment that is as least as old as some  f,  so that q = ql  for T < f  and 
that q = q  =  (1 -  ~',)q~  for T  b f . From  the comparative 
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statics results we  have  that T*,(~~)  > T*,(~,) and  will 
observe  the following pattern of  scrappage: 
if T*~  < f  ,  then scrappage  occurs at  T = T*~  and no  capital 
grant is received; 
if T*,  > f  , then scrappage  occurs at  T = T*,  and  a capital 
grant  is received;  'finally, 
if T*~  I  f  < Til,  then scrappage  occurs at  T = f  with a 
capital grant received. 
Because  of  variations in operating conditions and wage  rates across 
firms we  can expect  that T*  would be distributed across a sample  of 
properties.  Given a  grant structure of  this type, we  would  then expect  to 
see a marked shift in the overall scrappage  rate at  T  = f. This paper 
will examine a subsidy program with a structure similar to that above  and 
test if the observed scrappage  follows  the predicted pattern. 11. Data on Local Mass-Transit Providers 
The local mass-transit industry is the focus of the empirical 
analysis for several reasons.  First, the production processes of transit 
providers are relatively homogeneous and their inputs  (labor  hours and 
vehicle miles) are measurable.  This facilitates comparisons of cost- 
efficiency across transit providers.  Second, the stock of transit capita 
is also relatively homogenous and can be measured from fleet and mileage 
data.  Finally, transit service is provided by a heterogeneous set of 
institutions -- including city governments,  regional authorities, public 
agencies managed by private concerns, and wholly private operators.  Thes 
providers receive revenues from a wide variety of sources -- including 
fares,  federal operating assistance,  state and federal capital grants, 
local general revenues,  and local dedicated taxes.  By controlling for 
operating conditions and wage rates,  I use this heterogeneity to examine 
the impact of subsidies on scrappage. 
Data 
The data used here are collected under the Section 15 Reporting 
System administered by the Urban Mass Transportation  Administration  (UMTA 
Section 15 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act  (UMT  Act),  establishes a 
uniform accounting system for public mass transportation finances and 
operations.  All applicants and beneficiaries of Federal assistance under 
Section 9 of the UMT Act are subject to this system and are required to 
file annual reports with UMTA.  5 Section 15 data for fiscal year  (FY)  1979 through FY 1985 are 
available for 435 transit systems and include detailed information on 
revenue sources,  expenses, employees,  and hours and miles of service 
pr~vided.~  These data provide an unusually detailed panel of local 
governments' physical assets. In particular,  vehicle inventories for each 
system are broken down by model,  year of manufacture, and mileage. 
The sample was limited to 112 properties that only ran bus service 
-- as opposed to rail,  ferry,  etc. -- and that had more than five vehicles. 
By tracking vehicles across the 1982 through 1985 reporting years, 
scrappage decisions were observed for 15,829  vehicles,  including 1,005 
privately owned vehicles from 11 privately owned companies.  Vehicles that 
changed from active to inactive status or that were dropped from the fleets 
between report years were counted as scrapped. 
Federal Transit Policies 
The federal government finances a major part of local public mass 
transportation.  The largest component of federal transit aid is the 
Section 3 discretionary grant program that funds up to 75 percent of 
approved capital expenditures by local transit authorities.  A majority of 
these grants pay for major construction projects and expansions of large 
transit properties with rail systems.  The principal federal grant program 
for properties that only operate bus lines is the Section 9 formula grant 
program that distributes funds to urbanized areas for use in transit operating and capital expenditures.  Due to a desire by UMTA to wean local 
properties away from operating assistance, the Surface Transportation  Act 
of 1982 capped the level of funds available for operating assistance for FY 
1983 and beyond to some 90 percent of the FY 1982 level, or to 50 percent 
of a property's  operating deficit,  whichever was lower.  The overwhelming 
majority of public-transit  properties are constrained by the cap and 
receive no operating assistance on the margin.  The Section 9 capital funds 
are principally used for vehicle replacement and pay up to 80 percent of 
the cost of a new vehicle. 
Federal control over maintenance principally consists of setting an 
upper limit for deterioration of federally purchased equipment.  UMTA 
requires local transit properties to operate buses purchased with federal 
funds for at least 12 years or 500,000  miles.  Failure to do so results 
in a penalty in federal assistance for new capital purchases.  This 12-year 
limit,  however, is below the potential operating life of 15 to 20 years for 
standard bus models.  UMTA also requires that the number of spare vehicles 
available at periods of maximum service be no higher than 20 percent,  thus 
putting an upper limit on fleet size.  This guideline,  however, is not as 
rigorously enforced as the 12-year vehicle life guideline. 
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As shown in section 1,  the structure of the UMTA grants leads to 
the prediction that in the public sector we will observe low levels of 
scrappage before the 13-year point,  a marked shift in the scrappage at 13 
years,  then high levels of scrappage thereafter.  A similar pattern for privately-owned  vehicles is unlikely as they are not subject to such a 
discontinuity in the price of new equipment. 
Used-Bus Market 
The definition of scrappage used here has drawbacks since the 
disposition of equipment is not reported in the Section 15 data.  The 
used-bus market is highly fragmented and is ad hoc in nature.  No central 
data source of used-bus prices or sales exists.  UMTA officials report, 
however,  that the used transit bus market is depressed. The supply of 
public vehicles over 12 years old far exceeds demand and vehicles are most 
commonly sold for scrap.  To confirm this,  I collected transaction prices 
for some 645 transit vehicles sold in 1987 and 1988 by contacting all 
properties that solicited bids for used vehicles during this period.  9 
The results of this survey are shown in table 1.  Prices for 
publicly owned vehicles manufactured before 1971 ranged from $100 to 
$3500 with an average price of $511.  Even vehicles reported to be 
well-maintained typically did not sell for over $3,000.  Prices for 
vehicles manufactured between 1971 and 1975 ranged from $250 for scrapped 
vehicles to $6,000  for well-maintained vehicles.  Prices for newer vehicles 
manufactured between 1976 and 1980 averaged $8,863. 
Typically,  less than 10 bids were received per auction with a 
mean of five bids reported by properties that would provide this 
information.  Those bidding included Caribbean nations,  church groups, Table 1 
Used Transit Vehicle Prices 
in 1987 and 1988 
Year of  Average  Number of 
Manufacture  Price($)  Max.  Min.  Observations 
Public 
1961-65  $  301  $  1000  $  100  255 
1966-  70  841  3500  400  163 
1971-75  1648  6000  250  239 
1976  - 80  8863  17000  3300  8 
Private 
1961-65  $  3500  ---  --- 
1966-70  6590  - - -  - - - 
1971-75  7500  - - -  - - - 
1976  - 80  18000  - - -  - - - 
Source: Telephone survey by author. charter-bus operators,  people planning to make recreational vehicles,  and 
farmers in need of storage space.  If the vehicles were purchased with 
federal funds,  UMTA collected 80 percent of the proceeds with an allowance 
made for administrative expenses.  The costs of soliciting bids or holding 
an auction,  however, often were reported to exceed the remaining local 
share.  Given the low prices received for even well-maintained  vehicles, 
salvage and resale values represent a negligible percentage of the total 
cost of owning and operating transit equipment and are assumed not to 
affect maintenance and scrappage decisions. 
The private properties consist of seven in the New York 
metropolitan area with the rest scattered across the country.  lo  Their 
inclusion in the Section 15 data results from contracting with a public 
recipient of Section 9 funds to provide transit services.  As these 
contracts often provide for the leasing of public vehicles,  care was taken 
to examine scrappage decisions only on vehicles owned outright by private 
operators.  I was able to obtain used-vehicle prices for a much smaller 
sample of privately owned vehicles.  These prices,  also shown in table 1, 
suggest that the private vehicles are in better condition and command a 
higher price,  with prices averaging from $3,500  to $7,500  for vehicles 
manufactured before 1976.  Other private companies,  however,  reported 
selling their vehicles for scrap at the depressed prices similar to those 
received by public agencies.  Again,  given the depressed nature of the 
used-bus market, it is assumed that resale and scrap value does not affect 
scrappage decisions. 111.  Empirical Hazard Estimates 
This section presents nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the 
baseline hazard for public and private vehicles. These estimates are 
presented in tables 2  and 3,  respectively.  The hazards are also plotted, 
with 95 percent confidence intervals,  in figures 1 and 2.  The Kaplan-Meier 
estimator directly estimates the hazard function from the sample of 
vehicles.  For each time t,  the number of failures D(t)  (that  is, the 
number of vehicles scrapped) is divided by the total number of vehicles at 
risk at the start of time t,  R(t)  .I1  Censored spells  (that  is,  vehicles 
that are not observed to be scrapped) are included in the risk set previous 
to their censor time and are dropped thereafter.  This treatment of 
censoring yields a consistent estimate of the true hazard at each time t as 
long as the censoring mechanism and vehicle age are independent of each 
other.  Since censoring in this sample is due to the lack of data after 
1985 for vehicles of all ages, this is a reasonable assumption.  A further 
assumption of this estimator is that the population is homogenous across 
time,  a not unreasonable assumption for the GMC and Flxible New-Look buses 
manufactured in the pre-1977 period.  Observations of vehicles lasting more 
than 20 years were truncated at 20.  Less than 4  percent of observed 
vehicles were active after this age and strong parametric assumptions would 
be needed to make inferences about them. 
The estimates in general demonstrate the importance of federal grant 
policies for public-sector  scrappage. The hazard for public vehicles Table 2 
Public Vehicles: Failures, Censorings, 
and the Kaplan-Meier Empirical Hazard 
Age  Risk Set  Failures  Censorings  Hazard  Standard 
t  R(t)  D(t>  C(t>  H(t)  error 
Note: 2592 failures were observed and 12,232 censorings. 
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Source: Author's Calculations averages under 4  percent for years prior to age 13,  then jumps to over 11 
percent at age 13,  decreases slightly at age 14,  then rises steadily to 37 
percent by age 19.  Standard errors calculated for these estimates suggest 
that the public hazards are measured with much precision and that the shift 
at the 13-year point is statistically significant.  12 
The private estimates are estimated with less precision and exhibit 
more volatility,  but in general show a rise in scrappage from near 0  for 
the 1- to 6-year period to an average 5 percent for the 7- to 10-year 
period to 9 percent at the 13-year point. Due to only 1 scrappage out of 
143 in the age-12 risk set,  however,  the estimated hazard at year 12 is 
quite low,  and a shift appears to occur at the 13-year point -- contrary to 
the predicted pattern.  This shift can be attributed,  however,  to the 
smallness of the sample size and,  given the estimated hazards in the 
surrounding years,  the pattern of estimated hazards for private vehicles 
appears to be markedly different from the public sector. 
The Kaplan-Meier estimates have the benefit of not imposing any 
structure upon the underlying baseline hazard.  Since a major interest in 
this paper is how the hazard changes over time, these baseline estimates 
are of primary importance.  They do not allow,  however,  for the control of 
observed heterogeneity in wage rates and operating conditions.  Given the 
large number of private vehicles operating in the New York metropolitan 
area,  for example, adverse operating conditions might have a major impact 
on observed private-sector scrappage.  Accounting for this heterogeneity requires the introduction of parametric estimators discussed in the next 
two sections. IV.  The Fully Parametric Pro~ortional  Hazards Model 
This section presents results from a fully parametric 
proportional hazards model that imposes the commonly used Weibull structure 
on the underlying baseline harard.13  The advantage of this approach is 
that it controls for covariants,  such as wages and operating conditions, 
that affect scrappage.  The drawback is that if the underlying baseline 
specification is incorrect,  the estimates will be inconsistent.  Due to the 
short four-year time period of the data,  the beginning and end of most 
durations is not observed.  Allowance is thus made for left-  and right- 
censoring, respectively.  The notation follows that used in Meyer  (1988). 
The hazard for vehicle i is assumed to be of the Cox  (1972) 
proportional hazard form with baseline hazard Ao(t), 
where 
Ti =  the age vehicle i is scrapped, 
zi  (t)  =  a vector of time-dependent  explanatory variables for 
vehicle i,  and 
/3  =  a vector of parameters that is unknown. The probability of a vehicle lasting until t+l given that it has lasted 
until t can then be written as a function of the hazard given that zi(t) 
is constant between t and t+l. 
A Weibull baseline hazard of Xo(t)  = atQ-' is now 
imposed and equation  (9)  becomes 
(10)  P[T~ r t+l  1  Ti  B t 1 = exp(  - [  (t+l)'-  tQ]exp(zi(t)  '/3)  )  , 
where 
is the average of the hazard over the interval  [t,t+l).  This specification 
results in the hazard function exhibiting positive  (negative)  age 
dependence as a is greater  (less)  than 1.  The likelihood for a sample of 
N vehicles can be written as a function of the hazard and is shown in  (12) 
with the log-likelihood given in  (13). where 
Si =  1 if vehicle i is scrapped and 
0  otherwise, 
ki =  the age a vehicle is scrapped or censored,  and 
toi  =  the age at which vehicle i is initially observed. 
Maximization of L(a,/3)  allows for consistent estimation of a and /? if 
the Weibull specification is correct. 
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the 
estimation are given in table 4  for both the public and private properties. 
Included are the maintenance wage rate  (WAGE)  to control for the cost of 
maintenance, the average speed of operation  (SPEED)  to control for 
congestion,  the ratio of vehicles needed at peak periods to total vehicles 
(SPARE)  to control for utilization,  and dummy variables for manufacturer 
types (FIX and AMG) to control for vehicles manufactured by Flxible 
Corporation and American Motors,  respectively.  (The  remaining vehicles were 
manufactured by General Motors.) Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics:* 
Public versus Private Transit Properties 
........................................................ 
Independent 




(  $/hour) 
CITY  28/101  . .  . 
ATE  19/101  ... 
SPEED  13.22  11.12 
(milesfiour)  (1.91)  (2.88) 
SPARE  31.11  25.09 
(%  spare at  (11.25)  (8.71) 
peak period) 
CRASH  41.25  59.79 
(crashes  per  (18.41)  (32.25) 
1,000,000  miles) 
CRIME  76.39  83.42 
(property  crimes  (24.21)  (50.30) 
per 1,000  persons) 
.............................................................. 
* Means,  (standard  deviations). 
Source: Author's  calculations. Dummy variables are included for operation by city government 
(CITY)  and operation by the private consulting firm American Transit 
Enterprises  (ATE),  which has a reputation for having well-maintained 
fleets.  Finally,  a dummy variable for operation in the New York 
metropolitan area  (NY)  is included to control for adverse conditions unique 
to this area.  As over half of the observations of private vehicles occur 
in the NY area,  this is an important control.  The property crime rate 
(CRIME)  and vehicle accident rate  (CRASH)  are also used to control for 
hazardous operating conditions.  Finally the population density  (DENSE)  is 
included to measure congestion.  Due to data limitations, most variables 
are assumed to be constant for each property over the 1982 to 1985 time 
period with the mean of the available values for the period used in the 
estimation. 
The log likelihood function of equation  (13)  was maximized using 
the Berndt, Hall,  Hall,  Hausman  (1974)  algorithm;  the inverse of the outer 
product of the gradients evaluated at the final parameter estimates was 
used as an estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix. 
Different starting values led to the same estimates,  so the estimates 
seemed to be stable.  The results are shown in table 5. 
Equation 1  includes variables measuring wages and operating 
conditions,  but does not control for differences between the public and Table 5 











DENSE Table 5  (cont.) 
Weibull Hazard Model Estimates 
Sample Size  15,829 
Likelihood Value  -10,241.41 
*Estimated coefficents,  (standard errors) 
Source: Author's  calculations. private sectors.  The results, in general, are consistent with conventional 
wisdom in the transit industry. (Note  that positive values indicate that 
the variable has a positive effect on scrappage).  The baseline hazard 
shows a strongly positive time-dependence with a estimated at 2.0574. 
Evaluated at the means, this indicates that the baseline hazard rises 
steadily from under 2 percent for new vehicles to over 15 percent for 
vehicles over 18 years of age as shown in figure 3.  (Using  the estimated 
constant and estimated a  in equation 11 yields this baseline hazard 
estimate since means were subtracted from the explanatory variables.) The 
estimated hazards for FLX  and AMG-type buses,  also shown on figure 3,  are 
significantly lower than for the GMC buses.  Since AMG vehicles were only 
manufactured between 1975 and 1978,  however,  this result should be treated 
with caution.  The estimated hazard is higher in properties managed by ATE 
and lower in those managed by city governments.  The variables controlling 
for operating conditions do not all have the expected signs.  Operation in 
New York has a small negative effect,  which is surprising,  and areas with 
higher crime rates and accidents appear to have lower hazards.  Higher 
speeds increase the hazard as does a higher spare ratio and a higher 
population  density. 
The estimated coefficient for WAGE has a negative sign,  contrary 
to the prediction of the model,  but is extremely small,  suggesting that the 
level of maintenance wage has essentially no effect on scrappage decisions. 
A 10-percent increase in wages lowers the annual hazard by less than 0.2 
percent.  In  specifications that do not include operating characteristics, Figure 3 
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Source: Author's Calculations such as DENSE,  CRIME, and CRASH, the sign of WAGE is positive and 
significant -- but this appears to be due to the effects of operating 
conditions in high-wage areas such as New York. 
To explore how public scrappage might vary from this baseline, 
equation 2 includes dummy variables that equal one for public vehicles aged 
8 through 15,  AGE8 through AGE15,  respectively.  The results  (shown  in 
table 5 and figure 4) highlight the importance of the 13-year point in 
public behavior.  In the five years preceding this point, public-sector 
scrappage is reduced by 9 percentage points below the baseline, then shifts 
up by 6 percentage points at the 13-year point and rises above the baseline 
by year 15.  This shift suggests that the availability of federal subsidies 
are an important determinant of local scrappage decisions. 
The drawback of using the Weibull specification to examine shifts 
in public versus private scrappage over time is readily apparent in that 
allowing public-sector  scrappage to vary with the use of dummy variables 
imposes the Weibull structure on the private estimates.  Given the extent 
that the public estimates diverge from the Weibull pattern when allowed to 
vary,  this structure appears to be too constraining.  In the next section, 
we will use a more flexible functional form to more reliably determine 
shifts in the underlying baseline hazards. Figure 4 
Percent 
Scrappage Rate 
Public Vehicles vs.  Weibull Baseline 
0 
0  5  10 
Vehicle Age (years) 
Source: Author's Calculations V.  The Semiparametric Hazard Estimator 
The fully parametric hazard model allows for estimation of the 
impact of economic and environmental conditions on scrappage.  These 
estimates are consistent,  however, only if the specification of the 
baseline hazard is correct.  For this reason, statisticians have argued for 
the nonparametric estimation of the baseline hazard.  Meyer (1988), 
following Prentice and Gloekner (1978),  presents a semiparametric hazard 
estimator  (SPHE)  that combines both approaches -- allowing for 
nonparametric.estimation  of the baseline hazard while permitting estimation 
of the impact of explanatory variables.  We use this approach to assess the 
robustness and consistency of the Weibull estimates and to obtain a fuller 
analysis of the differences between the public-  and private-sector  baseline 
hazards. 
As before,  the hazard for vehicle i is of the proportional hazards 
form with baseline hazard Xo(t) . 
where 0 I  t I  T < co,  and Xo(t)  and /3  are unknown.  No structure, 
however,  is imposed on Xo(t).  Meyer notes that the average of the 
hazard over the interval  [t,  t+l)  is and makes the substitution 
so that  hi(t)  = exp(r(t)  +zi(t),8).  The log-likelihood is now 
Maximization  of L(7,p)  allows consistent estimation of /3  and of 
7(t),  (t=0,1,  . .  .,T-1).  Equation 1 was reestimated with the same ,8  but 
with 20 7(t)  instead of the Weibull baseline hazard. (Note  that the 
constant is omitted from ,8  in the SPHE.)  The results are shown under 
equation 3 in table 6 with the estimated y(t)'s  reported in table 7. 
In general, the SPHE appears to dominate the fully parametric 
estimator for our purposes.  A likelihood ratio test rejects the null 
hypothesis of a Weibull baseline,  indicating that the Weibull model is 
misspecified.  The chi-square  statistic with 18 degrees of freedom is 
1118.28 versus a critical value at the .O1 level of 34.8.  This strong 
rejection is not surprising given the extent that the public-sector 
estimates in section 4  diverged from the Weibull structure.  While many of 
the estimated coefficients for the operating and explanatory variable 
retain the same sign and magnitude,'  the estimated coefficients for CITY, Table 6 
Semiparametric Hazard Model Estimates* 












AGE8 Table 6  (cont.) 
Semiparametric Hazard Model Estimates 
Sample Size  15,829  15,829 
Likelihood Value  -9,682.27  -9,499.12 
*Estimated coefficents, (standard  errors).  Baseline hazard estimates shown on 
Table 7. 
Source: Author's  calculations. Table 7 
Semiparametric Hazard Mode1:Baseline Estimates* 
Year  (3)  (4) Table 7 (cont  .) 
Semiparametric Hazard Mode1:Baseline  Estimates* 
*Estimated  y(t),  (standard errors) 
Source: Author's calculations. NY,  and CRIME switch signs from negative to positive.  This is reassuring 
given that these signs, especially for NY,  are more in line with the 
conventional wisdom of the transit industry.  The estimated coefficient of 
WAGE remains negative but is highly inelastic. 
More importantly,  use of the SPHE permits a much fuller analysis 
of differences in the baseline hazards between the public and private 
sectors.  Equation 3 was reestimated with dummy variables to account for 
differences in public-  and private-sector  scrappage from age 8 through age 
20.14 These results are given in equation 4  with the corresponding 
baseline hazards shown in figure 5.  The impact of the grant structure on 
public-sector scrappage is readily apparent.  While the private-sector 
baseline remains under 10 percent until year 16 and then rises steadily 
through year 20, the public-sector baseline takes a distinct and 
significant  jump at the 13-year point from 4  percent to over 12 percent, 
twice that of the private sector. Scrappage then rises to over 25 percent 
for 15- and 16-year-old  vehicles and remains above the private sector until 
year 19.  The distinct difference in scrappage rates can be attributed to 
the availability of federal grants. 
An alternative approach to examining public and private 
scrappage is to look at the survivor functions for the two sectors.  The 
survivor function is defined as the percentage of vehicles of a given 
vintage that survive to a given age and is composed of the estimated hazard 
h  h 
components XI,  . .  . . .  ,  Xk  at  tl,  .  . .  .  . .  ,  Q  as follows: Figure 5 
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Source: Author's Calculations for k  = 1,  ....  20.  The survivor function estimates calculated from the 
estimated baselines are shown in figure 6 and further emphasize the 
difference between public and private scrappage policies. The two functions 
track closely through year 12,  then diverge as public scrappage sharply 
increases.  Again, this shift in the survivor function at the 13-year point 
can be attributed to the sudden availability of federal subsidies.  By age 
16 only 47 percent of the public vehicles survive as opposed to 73 percent 
for private vehicles. At age 20,  45 percent of private vehicles are still 
estimated to be in operation versus 20 percent for the public sector. 
As an example of the difference in cost between the two scrappage 
policies,  consider a public transit property that requires 500 vehicles to 
meet demand. With the public survivor function estimated above,  this would 
require new vehicle purchases of 35 per year.  The average age of the fleet 
would be 8.6  years.  Given the private-sector survivor function,  however, 
only 31 new vehicles a year would be required to maintain a 500-vehicle 
fleet.  This reduction in new purchases of four vehicles per year at a 
price of $150,000  per vehicle results in annual savings of $600,000.  The 
average fleet age would rise to 9.6 years.  An older fleet,  however, 
entails higher maintenance expenses.  Cromwell  (1988)  demonstrates that 
private transit properties devote significantly more resources to 
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Source: Author's Calculations cross-state  variation in capital subsidy policies,  an elasticity of 
maintenance with respect to capital subsidy rates of -0.158 is estimated 
with a standard error of 0.088.  This implies that the 80 percent federal 
capital subsidy reduces public sector maintenance by 12.8 percent.  For an 
average public property with 500 vehicles,  such a percentage increase 
results in increased costs of $920,000.  l5  Taking a one-standard-error 
range yields an estimate of $410,000  to $1,430,000,  bracketing the savings 
from reduced vehicle purchases.  These higher maintenance expenses thus 
potentially more than offset the savings from reduced replacement 
investment,  and if attributable to higher vehicle age,  suggest that the 
change in total costs from an increase in average vehicle age would be 
small.  If there are unobserved benefits from increased maintenance,  such 
as increased cleanliness and reliability of service,  however, the net cost 
of the additional maintenance would be smaller than the estimates 
above.  16 
The consistently lower survival rate of publicly owned vehicles 
after the availability of federal funds is direct evidence that federal 
capital grants reduce equipment life in the local public sector.  It 
suggests that federal grant policies that subsidize the purchase of new 
capital but ignore the maintenance of existing capital result in the 
increased deterioration of public infrastructure.  The magnitude of savings 
for the transit industry from a shift in policies,  however,  may be small if 
maintenance expenses offset reduced vehicle expenditures. VI.  Conclusion 
This paper examines capital policies in the public and private 
sector through analysis of the scrappage decisions of local mass transit 
providers.  It shows that the structure of federal grants has a direct 
impact on scrappage rates that leads to shorter equipment life in the local 
public sector.  The analysis applies hazard modeling techniques previously 
used for examination of unemployment duration and in the biometries 
literature.  The results show the advantage of the semiparametric hazard 
estimator  (SPHE),  which allows flexibility in comparing underlying baseline 
hazards across time and between sectors.  In particular,  the commonly used 
Weibull approach, which imposes a restrictive structure on the baseline 
hazard, is shown to be inconsistent for this application. 
Federal grant policies for mass transit subsidize the 
replacement of transit vehicles at a matching rate of 80 percent once these 
vehicles turn 13 years old.  Using the SPHE to compare scrappage decisions 
and equipment life in the public sectors shows that the availability of 
these grants results in shorter equipment life in local public transit 
properties.  While the estimates suggest that the net costs in local mass 
transit for increased bus replacement is small,  changes in local behavior 
are induced by distortionary grant policies and should be considered when 
designing federal infrastructure policy.  Policies that emphasize new 
capital construction,  as opposed to the maintenance of existing 
infrastructure,  may be counterproductive. Endnotes 
1. A good account of the "crisis" is given in Leonard  (1985). 
2. See Cromwell  (1988). 
3. For surveys of this literature,  see Pierskall and Voelker (1976),  and 
Sherif and Smith  (1981). 
4. The model is an extension of that used in  Jorgenson,  McCall,  and Radner 
(1967)  and in Nickel1  (1978).  For further discussion of maintenance 
and depreciation, see Cromwell  (1988). 
5. See UMTA  (1983). 
6.  Figure cited is as of the 1983 report year. 
7. See UMTA  (1985). 
8. See Touche Ross  (1986). 
9. Solicitations for bids for used buses were found in back issues of 
Passenger Trans~ort  from January 1987 through June 1988. 
10. Privately owned companies were identified using UMTA  (1986). 
11. See Kaplan and Meier  (1958). 
12. The standard errors were calculated using a suggestion in Kalbfleish 
and Prentice  (1980). 
13. This specification is used by numerous authors.  See Lancaster  (1979) 
and Katz  (1986). 
14. The baselines were constrained to equal one another for ages 1 through 
8 to reduce computation time.  Analysis of the Kaplan-Meier estimates 
suggests little difference in scrappage rates during this period. 
15. This estimate assumes average vehicle mileage of 27,500  per year and 
maintenance expenses of $0.53 per mile.  The mileage estimate is the 
average of mileage from the 1983,  1984 and 1985 fleet data.  The cost- 
per-mile estimate is a 1984 average from Cromwell (1988),  table 2. 
16. For further discussion of maintenance issues,  see Cromwell  (1988). References 
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